

# CORRUPTION AND CORRUPTION CONTROL IN AFRICA

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**Comments Welcome**

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### Abstract

*Anti-corruption strategies are most effective when they are participative and inclusive of all stakeholders in society. Such inclusiveness requires building coalitions among stakeholders—government, civil society, and NGO--in order to ensure the sustainability of reforms. The international community also has a role to play in supporting committed reformers who are more likely to generate challenges to their country's regimes. This paper examines the practical issues involved in minimizing corruption in Africa. It is argued that reforms are more likely to succeed when various stakeholders are involved in the design and implementation phase of an anti-corruption strategy. Such an approach creates the necessary consensus for reform as well as a sense of participation in improving the quality of governance.*

### Introduction

Controlling corruption in African countries—both high and low levels—is one of the greatest challenges to the establishment and consolidation of democratic systems in the continent. The notion that corruption adversely impedes development is no longer an issue of debate. Cross-country empirical work has confirmed the negative impact of corruption on institutions, growth and productivity, policy processes, property rights, and consequently, development (Rose-Ackerman, 1999; Kaufmann 1997 and 1998; Mauro 1997; Wei, Shang-Jin, 1997, Knack and Keefer, 1995). In quite a few African countries, the negative impact of corruption has been translated into political instability and frequent regime changes. The overthrow of democratic governments in countries such as Sierra Leone, Mobutu's Zaire, Moussa Troare's Mali, and Samuel Doe's Liberia are a few examples of countries where high-level and systemic corruption have been highlighted as factors that contribute to the denouncement and overthrow of these regimes. More recently, civil unrest also has been associated with increasingly high levels of systemic corruption and the lack of effective leadership necessary to deal with this persistent problem. In short, Africans have continued to hold their states responsible for economic hardships in large part because of widespread abuse in official circles. Paradoxically, this abuse fostered democratization in several countries in the early 1990s by forcing civil society to take matters into its own hands and demand more transparent and accountable systems of government (Kpundeh, 1992). However, in many of these African countries, a real political process and legitimate links have yet to grow. Corruption is at the core of this dilemma.

Until recently, citizens and, particularly bilateral and multilateral, donors have rarely held African governments accountable. But the globalization of markets dramatically highlights developmental inequities in these countries. Citizens want economic reforms such as liberalization and privatization. This focus on the economy has also renewed attention on more democratic forms of governance. Internal stakeholders and the international community are beginning to insist on transparency, creating a dilemma for those leaders who resist their countries' move to more inclusive, participatory governments. The demand for increased transparency, accountability, integrity, political and economic competition, and the involvement of civil society in the broader governance of the country places corruption at the center of these changes. But the fight against corruption requires the involvement of the entire country as well as the international community. Policymakers and academics agree that reform can only be sustained if a wide range of stakeholders—government, civil society, non-governmental

organizations (NGOs), the private sector, as well as the international community--is involved in the development of anti-corruption strategies.

Theoretically, democratic institutions offer the potential for citizens, NGOs, the private sector, independent media, and other stakeholders to carefully scrutinize the actions of politicians and government officials. However, some scholars argue corruption is more prevalent during the transitional stage to more democratic forms of governance, primarily because democratic political systems provide incentives and opportunities for corrupt practices. Conversely, established democracies have devised institutions to contain abuse. This argument has been challenged by some scholars who point to evidence from newly functioning democracies in Eastern Europe, Latin America, and Africa where existing structures have proven ineffective in curbing high levels of malfeasance (Riley, 1998; Robinson, 1998; Harris-White and White, 1996; Little and Posada-Carbo, 1996; Kpundeh, 1995). Additionally, there is mounting evidence in developing countries to contend that liberalization does not necessarily reduce corruption.

This paper examines the salient issues of why little progress has been made in the fight against corruption in Africa. The author focuses on the critical issue of participatory governance, which has been absent in anti-corruption reform initiatives and argues that reform strategies are more effective when they are participative and include all stakeholders. Coalition building is essential to sustaining an anti-corruption strategy and these coalitions must be reflective of all the stakeholders at the national and local levels including government, civil society, NGOs, and community-based organizations (CBOs).

The chapter begins with an investigation into the causes of corruption and the consequences for democracy and development. Second, it provides an analysis of the current academic and policy debate on reform strategies, highlighting policies designed to control, deter, and punish as well as discusses the kinds of initiatives that can be effective. Third, it explores the institutional and political requirements for a serious assault on corruption, focusing on the significance of political will and what needs to be done to design and empower anti-corruption agencies and build an effective judicial system for enforcing anti-corruption laws and regulations. Fourth, it analyzes the need for an integrated strategy and focuses on the role that civil society, (both independent, non-governmental organizations and the mass media), the private sector, and CBOs in the process. The chapter concludes with a look at the international community and how international institutions, including international civil society organizations, and foreign governments cooperate with, and strengthen the efforts of African states and societies to control corruption.

## **CAUSES OF CORRUPTION IN AFRICA**

Although there is widespread agreement among academics, policymakers and the informed public that corruption essentially involves the use of a public office for private gain, there is no consensus on the causes for corruption. An array of explanations includes centralization of power; lack of ethical leadership, morality, accountability, and transparency; greed; excessive or over-centralized economic and political power; and inefficiency. The variety

illustrates the often morally charged and ethnically grounded debate on this contentious issue (Riley, 1998; Johnston, 1997a; Kaufmann, 1997; Kpundeh, 1995; Olowu, 1993; Hope, 1987).

Rather than provide a detailed analysis of these causes (which in the author's view have been exhausted in the literature), a more useful examination focuses on key issues that contribute to this persistent problem despite attempts to mitigate many of the causes outlined above. The central argument is that corruption has lingered and even grown due to public office holders' refusal to follow the fundamental tenets of participatory governance--account for their actions and expenditures. It is clear from the democratic experience in most developing countries that establishing democratic forms of accountability is a long-term process that requires the involvement not only of politicians and elites, but civil society and the people in general. Civil society's role, however, in participatory governance in Africa has been sporadic because the government oftentimes has deliberately excluded it. More important, its various groups and interests have become very fragile and unable to act as a potent force as they have not been given the opportunity and/or protection to improve the quality of governance in their societies. The capacity of civil society and other stakeholders in the fight against corruption can only be useful when complemented with institutional interventions, which in most countries are controlled by the political and economic elites.

While institutions such as elected legislatures, parliamentary oversight committees, and watchdog groups are present in nearly all African countries, their effectiveness remains elusive. Ghana, Tanzania, and Benin, again, prepare for a multiparty election. However, despite ongoing political reforms, politicians who oppose government policies risk intimidation. Few will engage in genuine political debates prior to elections. In some countries, the ruling party controls the legislature and influences decisions and recommendations in the various parliamentary committees. Indeed, the notion of strict separation of powers and real checks and balances are not realized in these countries and consequently, oversight bodies serve no real purpose in the fight against corruption. But according to Johnston, democratic rights and processes, per se, do not make a significant contribution to anti-corruption efforts. Special reform agents only succeed when citizens organize themselves effectively. Their actions compliment institutional reforms, imbuing them with the proper social foundation, which is indispensable to their success (Johnston, 1998a).

The lack of effective citizen organizations can be explained primarily as a function of the ruling elites' capture of state and governmental institutions<sup>2</sup>. This capture has led to systemic corruption because political leaders and/or other powerful forces are not constrained by the society's institutions. National resources are monopolized, patronage and political cronyism are rampant, and the government dominates all facets of the economy. Such domination creates a climate for systematic exploitation of illegal income and rent-seeking opportunities by public officials. Recent empirical evidence suggests that corruption thrives where the state is unable to protect property and contractual rights, or to provide institutions that support the rule of law (Hellman et. al, 2000). These governments repress citizens and NGOs that press for improved governance and muzzle the press. Anti-corruption agencies lack the independence to be ineffective; political competition is stifled, and vocal opposition

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<sup>2</sup> I am grateful to Daniel Kaufmann for emphasizing this point.

politicians are marginalized from making valuable contributions to the governance of the country. Such actions undermine political development and stability as well as threaten the democratic experiment, and consequently national development. Long-term strategies for national development and improved governance in these countries are difficult.

The issue of decentralization is also a key issue. Governments have not only centralized political and economic power in the urban areas, particularly the capital cities, but they have failed to involve the rural areas and communities—the more vulnerable groups in the society. Some countries have attempted decentralization, but with obvious “strings” attached. Often political elites select their cronies or party sympathizers as operatives in the rural areas, which serves the primary purpose of maintaining their interests as opposed to genuine citizen participation and representation in the governance of their town or province. The government's decentralization attempts are simply an extension of the power of the elites who have captured state institutions and reward their supporters in the rural areas with positions of authority with little power. Rural areas remain poor, without revenue, as they are unable to raise funds or taxes to develop their communities. In those circumstances when they levy a tax, the proceeds are controlled and priorities determined by government elites. This inability for the people to genuinely participate in the governance of their communities has been a major contributing factor for entrenched corruption and the abject poverty in most rural areas in African countries. The growing numbers of people relocating to the capital cities in search of a better life help to maintain the perpetual dependency syndrome between rural and urban areas.

One of the emerging lessons from traditional reform efforts is the lack of coherent analyses by policymakers. They prescribe solutions before fully comprehending the basis of the problems. Several scholars have reminded us that there is no substitute to addressing corruption than a better understanding of a country's culture, history and political context (Johnston, 1998b; Kaufmann, 1988; Kpundeh, 1998, 1995; Olowu, 1993). The use of diagnostic surveys and other cross-country analyses of data on perceptions against institutional and other correlates are useful tools to help us better understand the causes and consequences of corruption<sup>3</sup>. Consequently, more appropriate priorities are established when reformers identify activities and agencies where corruption is concentrated (Kaufmann, Pradhan and Ryterman, 1998). Failure to develop a participative and inclusive approach to the design and implementation of anti-corruption strategies is part of a general breakdown in accountability. Governments that ignore the voice of its citizens by discounting their views on corruption and other governance-related problems, empirical analyses and the investigative work of the media prior to prescribing solutions has breached a fundamental goal of participatory governance. The World Bank Institute is currently working with Benin, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Ghana, and Malawi to conduct diagnostic surveys that will help depoliticize the corruption debate, to focus on concrete areas for reform, and to encourage a participatory process that mobilizes civil society and other stakeholders.

This lack of rigorous analyses also contributes to a poor understanding of the critical role of incentives in effecting change. A living wage, an adequate and progressively fair pay

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<sup>3</sup> For more detailed information on anti-corruption diagnostic surveys, see the work of Daniel Kaufmann and colleagues at the World Bank Institute, or visit their website at [www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance](http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance).

structure, for workers remains one of the more challenging issues facing reformers. In several countries such as Uganda, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, and Benin most unskilled laborers' pay is not a living wage. At the middle and upper levels, it is perhaps sufficient for family survival, but well below market reference points. In other words, the present salaries in most African countries lock public service employees into detrimental patterns of behavior and offset efforts to improve discipline, promote ethical conduct, and adhere to conflict-of-interest guidelines (World Bank, 1998). But the focus cannot only be on raising salaries as evidence has demonstrated that raising salaries, alone, does not necessarily reduce corruption. Rose-Ackerman, for example, argues that high pay reduces the marginal value of the extra funds available from taking bribes but does not reduce the value to zero (Rose-Ackerman, 1997). Instead, reform efforts must include incentives such as pensions and other retirement benefits that are generous enough to deter civil servants from accepting payoffs. But as other scholars have pointed out, the stakes must be raised such that those convicted of corruption and/or other abuses stand a chance of losing not only their government jobs, but also any subsequent benefits (Rose-Ackerman, 1997; Ades and Di Tella, 1996; Shleifer and Vishny, 1993).

Such punitive actions require efficient enforcement supported by strong political will. But the political will to fight corruption in most African countries is questionable and in some cases outright absent—a major contributing factor to the ubiquity of corruption in African countries (Kpundeh, 1998). The trend is that senior government officials make pronouncements about anti-corruption reform programs, which they can rarely translate into action. This kind of anti-corruption rhetoric has been a routine feature of the political process in countries such as Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Gambia, Liberia, Senegal, cote d'Ivoire, etc. This is less an attempt at reform and more a method to defuse opposition to the incoming regime, placate external agencies, and secure tenure in office. Some reformers use anti-corruption campaigns to indiscriminately eliminate opponents rather than confront difficult issues. They publicize allegations and evidence of corruption in an effort to demonstrate opponents' and former administration's hypocrisies and presumably their virtue—an indication of the cosmetic nature of many reform strategies (Kpundeh, 1998). The resulting effect is that citizens have become more cynical and have distanced themselves from their government's anti-corruption reform efforts. With every new regime come new promises of reform and new commitments to curb corruption. Governments need to demonstrate genuine credibility in their reform programs with the goal of recapturing the population that has remained distant from its reform efforts.

Another key factor accounting for the persistent corruption problem is simply that most the reform efforts have not been inclusive, and have in most countries, been dependent on the good nature and intentions of a particular person. There are historical accounts of well-intentioned reformers who, unable to mobilize supportive constituencies, faltered because they could not neutralize the resistance; for example the short-lived Buhari Administration in Nigeria (December 1983 to August 1985), Ghana in 1979 under Rawlings, and Liberia in 1980 under Samuel Doe. Despite Tanzanian President Mkapa's anti-corruption strategies, he has been ineffective because he failed to adopt a reform program that was inclusive and participative. Instead, his attempts at anti-corruption reforms have inadvertently painted a picture of a “one man show”—someone who had no understanding of the political dynamics and complexities involved in addressing corruption where the problem is systemic. He failed

to appreciate the value of building coalitions with other stakeholders. Collective action to fight corruption is a valuable tool primarily because society supports a reform paradigm that removes control from individuals and popularizes the mandate for accountability with effective citizen involvement. But more important, broadening political participation enhances the array of tools and strategies that can be utilized to deal with a wider range of needs, priorities, and objectives in civil society and the political system (Kpundeh, 1998).

The above discussion suggests that corruption has been a difficult, systemic, and persistent problem in African political economies. It has had damaging effects in terms of economic growth and general development objectives. Some scholars have argued that the economies in some developing countries are difficult to distinguish from maladministration and incompetence, large scale fraud, organized crime, and outright theft during kleptocratic regimes, especially in those economies that have continuously declined (Rose-Ackerman and Coolidge, 1999; Ellis, 1996, Levi and Nelken, 1996, Hope, 1985). However, consensus that systemic corruption has had very damaging effects on African countries has highlighted the urgent need to address it with more analytical work, and with policies that shift the frame of reference from months to years—essentially supporting the need for a long-term commitment to reform.

### **ANTI-CORRUPTION STRATEGIES IN AFRICA**

The previous discussions outline some of the reasons for corruption's tenacity, its effects on development, and why reducing the debilitating effects of corruption has become a priority in a majority of African countries. The urgency has been demonstrated in myriad ways resulting in some scholars suggesting that some of these actions relate to the so-called “coming anarchy” in Africa, where crimes and social crises are part of its characteristics (Kaplan, 1994, 1996, 1997). One dimension that is consistent with Kaplan’s analysis is that we now see dissident or rebel groups in Africa organize into an armed cliques, ready to fight to overthrow an incumbent government alleged to be corrupt. This new dimension has borrowed military governments' ideas, particularly in West Africa where corruption was supposed to be one of the primary reasons for the overthrow of civilian governments.

Three events in Africa have given this new phenomenon visibility: (1) the overthrow of Mobutu’s corrupt government in Zaire, (2) the overthrow of the government in Sierra Leone and (3) Charles Taylor’s long fight in Liberia to overthrow Samuel Doe. In Zaire, Laurent Kabila claimed he was fighting to overthrow the Mobutu Administration due to rampant corruption. In Sierra Leone, rebel forces joined the RUF under Foday Sankoh as a brutal insurrectionary force, which claimed the initial fighting was to overthrow the corrupt All People’s Congress (APC) government that had been in power for about twenty-three years. And in Liberia, Charles Taylor fought Samuel Doe’s government for several years and the ECOMOG Peacekeeping force that tried to stop him. Another rebel group headed by Prince Johnson—one of Taylor's rivals, eventually killed Samuel Doe. Taylor eventually won elections to become President of Liberia in 1997.

Violence is just one of a variety of strategies African countries have adopted to eliminate corrupt governments. Strategies include national campaigns that focuses on corruption inquiries, training, capacity building, anti-corruption agencies; local or citizen level campaigns, which emphasize community oversight, investigative reports from the media; private sector efforts, which include local chapters of Transparency International; populist initiatives such as military coups, moral campaigns, and civil servant purges, and international efforts by the World Bank, IMF, Transparency International, OECD, and other bi-lateral donors (See table).

<b>Types of Anti-Corruption Strategy</b>	<b>General Characteristics</b>
<b>National Efforts</b>	Corruption inquiries; training within state and public institutions; Islands of Integrity; legal approaches; Anti-corruption agencies; Auditor General and Parliamentary Oversight Committees; Police and Inter-Agency Cooperation; Capacity Building, Codes of Conduct for Public Officials, and Declaration of Assets.
<b>Local or “Citizen” Level</b>	Community Oversight, Media, coalitions with stakeholders, Ombudsman—complaints and redress; local chapters of Transparency International promoting “pillars of integrity”; decentralization and deregulation; protection against arbitrary nature of the state; service delivery surveys on public services; business enterprise surveys on corruption.
<b>Populist Initiatives</b>	Military coup d’etats; moralization campaigns; civil servant purges; public humiliations and executions; quasi-official tribunals; property seizure, heavy fines, and imprisonment.
<b>International Efforts</b>	World Bank and IMF policies; OECD efforts to criminalize transnational bribery; Transparency International’s interventions; bilateral donor efforts.

Source: Compiled by the author drawing from Riley, 1998, and other sources.

### *National Efforts*

National efforts to fight corruption have been fundamentally government-driven without much involvement from other stakeholders. The most common examples are anti-corruption institutions such as the Inspector General of Government in Uganda, the Kenya Anti-Corruption Authority, the Prevention of Corruption Bureau in Tanzania, the Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice, the Serious Frauds Office in Ghana, the Anti-Corruption Bureau in Malawi. While their levels of authority vary from country to country, their general purpose has been to induce fundamental changes in the attitudes of public officials through awareness raising campaigns, investigating allegations of corruption, and prosecuting those who have violated the public's trust. These institutions have produced mixed results due to a combination of factors including their vulnerability to regime changes, lack of sufficient autonomy, lack of political support from the political leadership, and in most cases and most important, a lack of resources. In Uganda for example, the Inspectorate General of Government has worked to uncover corruption cases, demanded severe punishment, and constructed a new strategy that focuses on grassroots awareness. Despite these accomplishments, the Inspectorate continues to be constrained by insufficient funding; inadequate staff; and a shortage of vehicles, computers, photocopiers, and investigative equipment such as video cameras and recorders (Kpundeh, 2000).

Parliamentary oversight committees have had little, if any, impact. Only a few countries such as Uganda, Kenya, and Ghana have effectively utilized legislative committees. For example in Uganda, the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) has vigorously demanded proper accountability of government expenditures from ministries and government agencies. Many senior officials have been prosecuted and dismissed as a result of its efficient work. The PAC has exposed malfeasance in all areas of the Ugandan Government, forcing some government ministers out of office and censuring others. To ensure its continued success, some of its functions have been decentralized and are now handled by the District Accounts Committees (Kpundeh, 2000). This has strengthened the auditing function at all levels of government and society. It is harder for aberrant behavior to go unnoticed. In countries such as Sierra Leone, Nigeria, and Tanzania, where this kind of institutional strategy has not contributed to the fight against corruption, it is arguably the institutional arrangements, and the dominance of the ruling party in Parliament that are the obstacles. In Tanzania, for example, members of its public accounts committee are often rotated, prohibiting continuity in policies.

Codes of conduct for senior government officials and civil servants have been introduced in Tanzania, Uganda, Mali, and Malawi. Top government officials and high-level civil servants are required to adhere to a leadership code of conduct, which in most cases includes provisions for declaration of assets, income, and liabilities. While these procedures are productive and necessary, they are usually ineffective because they are not enforced. For example, less emphasis is placed on the monitoring of declarations, drastically reducing its utility to prevent illicit enrichment. The lack of capacity and political will to verify declarations also has been a major factor in its ineffectiveness. Several countries influenced by organizations such as Transparency International and other donors have adopted integrity pledges and “islands of integrity” which are verbal commitments to introduce integrity in governance and in public administration.

National strategies can make inroads when they are supported by strong political will at all levels of government. However, the constraints identified above have led to a general cynicism from the populace as to the national level's sincerity to address the problem. In some countries, usually the "small fry" is prosecuted for wrongdoing and the “big fish” go untouched. There are so many examples of this behavior in Uganda, Sierra Leone, Ghana, Tanzania, Nigeria, etc. that this seems to be the rule and not the exception. One of the greatest dangers to the preservation and development of a society is the loss of trust and faith not only in government, but also in its institutions. Selective law enforcement, focusing mainly on small fry and opposition members has undermined public outreach and awareness raising campaigns that preach about the evils of corruption. People recognize that the benefits of corruption outweigh the costs, and consequently find the awareness messages inconsistent with reality. It is difficult to sustain a reform program without a credible messenger and strong political will, especially from critical areas such as enforcement.

### *Local or Citizen Efforts*

The influence of Transparency International has raised the stakes in the political economy of addressing corruption. Several countries including Ghana, Uganda, Tanzania, Nigeria, Zambia, and Zimbabwe have established local chapters that continue to push for reform. Between 1996

and 1999, Transparency International in partnership with the World Bank Institute organized National Integrity Workshops in Tanzania, Malawi, Uganda, and several other African countries. Additionally, this collaboration conducted investigative journalist training aimed at improving journalists' skills and confidence, and cultivated a renewed commitment to the fight against corruption. More recently, with the assistance of the World Bank Institute's Core Course Program on Anti-Corruption, several countries have formed coalitions. For example, the Ghana Anti-Corruption Coalition was organized by a variety of stakeholders, including representatives from government, to work more closely in implementing a national strategy. In Tanzania, civil society, media, and private sector representatives formed the Tanzania Civic Monitor (TACIMO) to monitor the implementation of the National Anti-Corruption Action Plan.

Establishing civil society organizations to perform the function of community oversight is encouraging. It is a homegrown strategy, which demonstrates ownership and improves chances for sustainability. A strong civil society is essential for the kind of structured political competition that can remedy problems inherent in systems where there is a lack of civil liberties and political freedoms, and incentives. More importantly, it can reinforce the political will needed for reform (Johnston, 1998; Kpundeh, 1998). However, civil society in African countries traditionally has been weak and divided, and consequently, its contributions to improving governance sporadic. In the early 1990s, the pro-democracy movements in Africa drew large numbers of people into political debate and organization. The leaders of Benin's public employees union, for example, opposed privatization and criticized structural adjustment measures. They contended these measures placed the burden of reform on the lower grades of civil service rather than the "plunderers and corrupt ones" who initiated the program (FBIS Daily report: Sub-Saharan Africa, 1991). In Cote d'Ivoire, the *Syndicat National de Recherche et d'Enseignement Supérieur*, the teachers union, demanded that "the immense fortunes illicitly acquired and stashed abroad should be brought back, and that personalities who obtained huge loans through state guarantees should be summoned to repay them" (Harsch, 1993). Several African countries have not been able to build on the momentum of the pro-democracy movements due to repressive laws, that squash the media and organized citizen protests; or governments do not encourage *genuine* political competition and/or citizen participation.

More important, civil society organizations have been ineffective because few have the support of government in their efforts. Institutions such as Ombudsman in Malawi, the Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ) in Ghana, Public Complaints Commission in Nigeria, and other organizations that address complaints from citizens and/or protect them against the arbitrary nature of the state, have in most countries been in constant conflict with government officials. Although many are constitutionally established institutions, most governments view them as adversaries and attempt to stifle their progress through intimidation of their officials and control of their budgets. In Ghana, for example, President Rawlings identified the Director of CHRAJ during his address to Parliament early this year, as the person who has been reversing government decisions designed to address malfeasance. The agency is guaranteed in the constitution, but it is difficult to be effective when the government considers the organization its adversary. Additionally, budgetary constraints have required CHRAJ to supplement its operations from bilateral donors. Some of these organizations have also taken on the role of civic monitor by conducting service delivery surveys designed by local experts to help public managers and policy makers determine the effectiveness of government services and its

delivery system. These surveys have been useful in countries such as Uganda, Tanzania, Ghana, and Zimbabwe, allowing consumers an opportunity to conveying strong messages to service providers. The results have been used as a mandate to design specific strategies to improve service delivery.

### *Populist Initiatives*

Populist initiatives such as civil servant purges, arrests, detention, and public humiliations of senior government officials are more prevalent following military coup d'états. In some countries, corrupt officials are beginning to receive harsher punishments including executions in Ghana under Rawlings in 1979 and in Liberia under Samuel Doe in 1980. Some military regimes have confiscated the property of public officials as in Sierra Leone after the military coup in 1992. It is generally characteristic of military governments to institute commissions of inquiry to investigate deposed government officials for embezzling and mismanaging government funds. After the military coup in 1992, the military government of Valentine Strasser immediately established three commissions of inquiry. These inquiries were charged with the investigation of former senior government officials in the Momoh and Stevens regimes, and all public officials, members of the board and employees of parastatals, the armed forces, and the police force (Kpundeh, 1994).

In the Sierra Leone case, and in others such as Gambia, Ghana, Liberia, etc., quick-fix measures –anti-corruption purges and moralization campaigns instituted by military regimes to deal with corruption have not been successful. Dele Olowu, argues that “the existence of political will to genuinely tackle corruption must not be assumed on the basis of policy pronouncements by political leaders. Those most vocal often turn out to be the ones who aid and abet corruption most.” (Olowu, 1993). This observation proved true in Sierra Leone. Despite the military's stated mission to eradicate mismanagement and institutionalized malfeasance, the administration was plagued with accusations of corruption. Its own members ignored its policies aimed at infusing morality and discipline. Senior military personnel including the Head of State Strasser, lived luxurious lives, probably better than those they kicked out. The public's trust dissipates when people witness widespread abuse, disrespect for human rights, and a blatant lack of transparency and accountability (Kpundeh, 1999a).

In general, populist initiatives have not been successful in Africa. They have mainly focused on quick-fix measures and meting out punishment to deposed government officials. The record of failure is exceedingly high for measures that use the blunt instrument of prosecution (or the fear of prosecution) as their principal tool of compliance. Corruption and other crimes are based upon motive, opportunity and means, and how these elements are built into the relationship between private citizens and government agents. A general lack of understanding and appreciation of the institutionalization of corruption by military governments have largely been responsible for their focus on individuals. For military officials, it seems corruption is viewed as a problem of individuals with excessive ambition and greed. If this were the case, then a quick-fix strategy of throwing out the “rotten apples” ought to work. But when this action has been taken, for example Ghana, Sierra Leone, Gambia, Nigeria, etc., corruption has persisted and sometimes flourished. Exposure, humiliation, prosecution, and/or disciplinary action against corrupt officials, remove the offender, but fail to eliminate the offense (Kpundeh, 1993).

Corruption has continued unabated in these countries. Institutional weaknesses have not been addressed and the culture has remained unchanged. Consequently, the circumstances that produced the corruption still subsist in most cases, recur, and are now entrenched in the system.

### *International Efforts*

Efforts at the international level highlight the seriousness of addressing malfeasance as integral on the new development agenda to reduce poverty. This new agenda involves sustaining reform efforts in developing and transitioning countries to enable market economies and liberal democratic political systems to grow. Additionally, it is constructed to prioritize the interests of the poor and marginalized within the context of higher ethical standards in donors and an enabling state (Riley, 1998). Based on this agenda, international organizations such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the UNDP, OECD, and bilateral donors have developed new policies that are demonstrative of their intolerance with corruption and their desire for African governments to institute policies to control this malaise. Through technical and other forms of assistance, multi and bilateral donors aiding African governments in the implementation of reform measures that reduce opportunities for corruption, build capacity, reform the public sector, and strengthen institutions that will contribute to improving the quality of governance.

Recent regional initiatives have promoted good governance. For example, the African Governance Forum, a deliberative process that includes sub-Saharan African countries and their external partners, is an opportunity for regular dialogue and interaction on good governance. The Forum held its first meeting in July 1997 in Ethiopia, focusing on governance, and its second in Ghana, June 1998, focusing on accountability and transparency. The Africa Development Bank (ADB) has adopted governance and corruption as performance factors in credit worthiness when considering loans to regional member countries. Under the auspices of the Global Coalition for Africa (GCA) ministers and senior officials from Benin, Botswana, Ethiopia, Ghana, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, and Uganda have adopted a set of twenty-five anti-corruption principles demonstrating a concerted and collaborative effort to combat corrupt practices.

However, international and regional initiatives to address corruption will meet with little success unless they are supported and coordinated with effective action against domestic abuses (Johnston, 1998). Switzerland, for example has made some strides in helping to discourage the laundering of ill gotten and embezzled funds by agreeing to freeze and return stolen wealth deposited in its banks. For example, at the request of Nigeria's Obasanjo Government about \$650 million was frozen in 140 accounts throughout Switzerland and President Clinton and some European governments also pledged support (Masland and Bartholet, 2000). In April 1997, Swiss authorities agreed to return US\$2.2 million to Mali as repatriated funds of the former President Troare. They were responding to claims by the successor government that embezzled funds had been illegally deposited in Swiss Banks. In May 1997, Switzerland also agreed to freeze assets of former Zairean President Mobutu, which were found in the country. Authorities subsequently announced that they had been able to identify US\$3.4 million in bank accounts belonging to Mr. Mobutu and his relatives (Harsch, quoted in Hope, 1999).

This concerted international effort to deal with corruption is a far cry from the Cold War days when despots like Mobutu often had the backing of Western capitals. Because *Kleptocrats* like Mobutu resisted Communism, the developed world condoned their schemes to get rich fast by plundering national treasuries and shipping the money to banks in the United States and Europe. The battle against corruption is now becoming a priority for Western powers trying to bring stability and prosperity to global markets. In the United States, for example, at least three pieces of legislation, one a Clinton Administration initiative, have been proposed to make the handling of corrupt money a crime. The Treasury Department also announced a proposal, earlier this year, to give the government more power to battle money laundering of all types (Masland and Bartholet, 2000).

The above discussion clearly demonstrates there is no silver bullet to deal with corruption. The forms and causes vary from country to country and consequently, attempts to confront it also vary to fit each country's realities. However, lessons emerging from countries with successful reforms efforts, clearly illustrate strong political will at all levels of government is pivotal.

### **THE SIGNIFICANCE OF POLITICAL WILL IN FIGHTING CORRUPTION**

Reform efforts are oftentimes unsuccessful due to a combined influence of inadequate strategies, political resistance, poor participative approach, failure to develop sustainable efforts, and the inability to construct appropriate tools to establish systemic change. Political will is another particularly critical component for sustainable and effective anti-corruption strategies and programs. Without it, governmental efforts designed to improve civil service, strengthen transparency and accountability, and reinvent the relationship between government and private industry will prove to be ineffective (Kpundeh, 1998). However, neither its presence nor absence can be presumed in any single initiative. Instead, political will is evident by the level of participation that is built into reform initiatives, incorporating a range of political actors and civil society. In other words, unwavering determination to fight corruption is not only a problem for leaders and bureaucratic reformers. The private sector, too, may lack the will to overcome corrupt systems. Citizens face the problems of mobilizing for collective action and turning their convictions into changes in public administration.

The growing pressures to address issues of corruption from both domestic and international stakeholders have also shown strong commitment from top leadership, both in the opposition and civil society organizations. Opposition figures have made corruption a major issue while those in government have formed new anti-corruption agencies as a response. The desire to change the culture of corruption can reside in many locations. Numerous examples illustrate reform efforts that have arisen from each branch of government, the political opposition, civil society, international organizations, and private sector institutions. Each group has different motives and goals, and consequently defines success differently. But political will neither originates nor manifests in a vacuum. Rather, it is the reflection of complex circumstances that incorporate the aspirations of individual leaders, a calculation of the benefits that can be derived from changes in rules and behaviors, and a belief in the ability to muster adequate support to overcome resistance to reforms (Ibid.).

While these reformist opportunities represent platforms for change, they often do not incorporate comprehensive strategies for sustainable change. In many cases, anti-corruption campaigns are political, rather than ideological, in motivation, scope, and objectives (Gillespie and Okruhlik, 1991; Riley, 1983;). As such, they are political instruments employed to delegitimize the previous regime, purge the opposition, or legitimate the current regime by temporarily decreasing corruption. Alternatively, they may be a tactical response to challenges from a counter-elite, popular discontent arising from socioeconomic conditions, or adverse publicity or investigations. Even when the anti-corruption campaigns are not just political instruments, the strategies may be too broad-based to have any impact or may create disequilibria, by over-fortifying the powers of the head of state or, instead, undermining his effectiveness (Gillespie and Okruhlik, 1991).

Michael Johnston describes political will as “where the analytical and practical aspects of the corruption issue meet, recognizing that active political processes and strong leadership are necessary parts of any effective response to malfeasance” (Johnston, 1997d). But what has been lacking in several African countries is the demonstration of a credible intent by political leaders to attack the perceived cause or effects of corruption at a systemic level—translating policy pronouncements and rhetoric to actions that are sustainable. For example, in Sierra Leone, new governments regularly proposed commissions of inquiry, anti-corruption squads and tough legislation. However, few of these approaches contained specific enforcement components. Plans to establish an ongoing independent commission against corruption, to revise salaries, to provide incentives to public workers, and to reorganize the civil service remain unaccomplished (Kpundeh, 1998). Similarly, in Nigeria, “the preoccupation with panic measures and the creation of ad hoc panels and tribunals to replace non-functioning legal institutions for ensuring public accountability have not been particularly helpful” (Olowu, 1988). “Political actors often talk of accountability and integrity but this by itself does not translate into a genuine commitment to detect and penalize unethical behavior. Even when anti-corruption agencies are created, they are usually denied the resources needed to achieve their stated purpose...in many cases the codes of ethics they are asked to enforce have no broad-based popular understanding or support” (Ibid. 1993).

In several countries, the leadership has taken steps to demonstrate a commitment to reform by either disclosing their assets and/or seeking aid and technical assistance from international and bilateral donors. In Tanzania, for example, President Mkapa disclosed his assets and those of his wife after he assumed presidency. In Ghana, Benin, Nigeria and Malawi, the various Heads of State have requested assistance directly from the World Bank to help with corruption. With the assistance of the World Bank Institute, diagnostic surveys are either underway or are in advanced planning stages as first steps to understanding the causes and consequences of corruption prior to developing a reform strategy. Subsequently the question is what are the political and institutional requirements needed for a serious assault against corruption in Africa.

Rather than provide a laundry list of actions in response to the causes outlined earlier, it is important to stress that remedies should be country specific based on sound analytical work that delineates the vulnerable areas and the reasons for lack of progress. “One size fits all” kinds of suggestions are ineffectual. Initially, several political and institutional requirements need to be in place and can be divided into governmental actions and civil society programs. The former is a variety of legal, administrative and organizational responses executed by a system of incentives; the latter engage the forces and interests of society in anti-corruption efforts,

providing sustainable support. Neither strategy is likely to be sufficient alone. Both government and civil society programs work best in partnership, where public opinion and social interests support reform, and anti-corruption efforts in civil society enjoy the protection and encouragement that only government can provide (Kpundeh, Johnston and Leiken, 1998; Dininio, Kpundeh and Leiken, 1998).

Government actions fall into four broad areas: legal reforms, public administration and regulation, financial management and control, and intragovernmental accountability and oversight. All countries have laws against fraud and corruption, and rather than create more laws, it is important to review and, if necessary, strengthen existing legislation. Modernizing the penal code to increase the costs of corruption include criminalizing bribery and strengthening laws against illicit enrichment, protecting whistle-blowers, financial disclosure, freedom of legislation, watchdog agencies, supreme audit institutions, financial management systems, etc. Aggressive enforcement of existing laws in African countries remains one of the missing links in supporting reform.

Some countries have chosen to create special agencies that have the primary responsibility for change. For example, the Inspector General of Government in Uganda, the Kenya Anti-Corruption Authority, the Prevention of Corruption Bureau in Tanzania, the Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice, and the Serious Frauds Office in Ghana, the Anti-Corruption Bureau in Malawi, the Directorate for Control of Economic Crimes in Botswana, the Anti-Corruption Bureau in Zambia were all created to lead their countries' reform efforts. Most have been modeled on the successful operations of the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) in Hong Kong. Despite their duplication, the agencies fail to produce similar results. Unfortunately, the Hong Kong model cannot easily be transferred to African countries (Doig, 1995).

Briefly, Hong Kong's ICAC is a well-financed operation--its 1999-2000 budget is US\$100 million and operates with three functional departments. The Corruption Prevention Department receives 7 percent of ICAC budget; the Community Relations Department receives 18 percent of the budget and three quarters of that goes to the Operations Department, which is responsible for investigating complaints and pursuing evidence of irregular spending by civil servants as well as and the private sector (Heilbrunn and Stevens, 1999). The ICAC staff is carefully recruited, highly paid, subject to internal monitoring and a strict disciplinary code. Staff members cannot be transferred to other departments and cannot leave ICAC to work for senior government officials who have been investigated (B.E.D. de Speville, 1998). Contrast this with the budget of the Inspectorate of Government in Uganda who has made considerable progress despite overwhelming constraints. According to the Inspector General of Government of Uganda, the government has increased its budget and staffing levels for the 1999/00 fiscal year but the office remains under facilitated. Five regional offices are not sufficient especially since staff is inadequate and improperly trained to perform its tasks. Most officers are young graduates with no training in investigation and prosecution (Tumwesigye, J, 2000). Other African examples such as Zambia, Kenya, and Malawi are highly influenced by Hong Kong in their legislation and strategies, but are not equally equipped with their sizable budget.

Aside from its abundant resources and highly qualified staff, neither of which is always available in African countries, it operates within a relatively well-regulated administrative culture, alongside a well-equipped police force, within a supportive political and legal framework

(Kpundeh, Johnston and Leiken, 1998). This is extremely critical as there is usually the suggestion that anti-corruption agencies can only be successful when they report to Parliament. Hong Kong, Singapore, and to some extent Botswana are evidence of such. The ICAC reports to the Governor (now Chief Executive); the Director of the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) is appointed directly by, and reports to the President; the Director General in Botswana reports to the President. What all these examples demonstrate is where the anti-corruption agency reports is less important in an environment where the legal framework, enforcement and oversight mechanisms, whistle blower protection laws, lack of genuine political competition, and the institutional structures that introduce a checks and balance schematic are absent and/or weak.

In Tanzania for example, the Director General of the Prevention of Corruption Bureau (PCIB) reports to the President, but where the Director General reports, is less important than the kinds of legislation and resources it needs to perform daily operations, especially in countries where the Head of State has the political will effect change. If legislation is passed to make PCB report to Parliament, the current parliamentary oversight mechanisms (budget, finance and public accounts committees) with their lack of resources and trained personnel, are ineffective. The Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) political party dominates parliament. Consequently, reports and policies from the Executive have the rubber stamp of approval. Instead, the current operational laws of the Bureau should be examined to ensure it has the power to investigate and prosecute; and it is not subject to veto from the Director of Public Prosecutions, (as is the case currently in Malawi). It must also have adequate resources to attract and recruit a competent and dedicated staff.

I do not wish to imply in the preceding argument that Anti-Corruption Bureaus should not report to Parliament or provided autonomy. Reporting to Parliament is a way of insulating the agency from political interference. But the more critical issue is that a system of checks and balances ought to be present and functioning. Measures to improve the competence of the executive, judiciary, and the legislature need to be introduced. The judiciary cannot play a significant role if it is not autonomous. A check and balance schematic that introduces multiple chances of veto can prevent government from acting without the consent of the institutions organized along different interests and representing various constituencies (Rose-Ackerman, 1997). As was argued earlier, if the institutions are not in place and working well, it becomes difficult to compliment the efforts of other stakeholders outside of government.

Civil society programs raise awareness, increase citizen participation, civic monitoring, and political competition. Political competition, how people win and lose power, has been an issue that has received less attention. The absence of genuine political competition in elections—winner take all politics and the notion of a zero-sum game is a common feature in a majority of African elections. Until recently, the violence and intimidation, usually associated with electoral politics overshadowed elections and consequently, few competent citizens participated. Campaign finance abuse is also becoming a critical element. Because the cost of running for office is expensive, aspiring politicians obtain funds from the private sector and other backers with promises of huge contract awards and senior-level political appointments. Where there is no effective monitoring of political contributions and/or contribution limits, financing elections has become a way of supporting dictators or incumbents with the hope of reaping the illegal benefits of elected office. Proposals to reform include limitations and regulations on donations, and full and immediate disclosure of contributors.

A serious assault against corruption is difficult in an environment where there is an absence of political will. Additionally, the fight against corruption has to be part of a general on-going reform process. The late Claude Ake used to say, “You can only build democracy around democrats”. Similarly, an anti-corruption strategy has to be a major component of overall public sector reform that addresses civil service issues, financial management systems, supreme audit institutions, strengthening watchdog and oversight mechanisms, judicial and legal reforms, strengthening incentives, etc. This is not to imply that without political will, the reform process is doomed. Political will can be nurtured by involving a variety of stakeholders in the reform process—building a constituency that recognizes the value of reform and dedicates itself to monitoring and defending a reform strategy. Such a constituency—its interests not always aligned with the political leadership can serve as an effective check on political actors’ abuse of power, particularly as a challenge to the non-responsiveness of the status quo.

### **THE NEED FOR AN INCLUSIVE STRATEGY**

The thesis that anti-corruption approaches are most effective when they are participative and inclusive of all stakeholders has been supported directly and indirectly by the previous discussions. Such inclusiveness requires the building of coalitions among stakeholders—government, civil society, NGOs, etc., to ensure that reforms are sustainable. Coalition building in Africa has not been a common practice. What we have witnessed in several African countries is separate reform efforts—government driving their anti-corruption reform agenda with no involvement from civil society and civil society accusing government of a general lack of commitment. This relationship has been adversarial and has driven a wedge between the various stakeholders, consequently resulting in a lack of a cohesive strategy.

A participative approach to confront issues of accountability, especially at the community level has been a historical tenet in African societies. In Botswana, for example, John Holm (1998) argues that the establishment of democratic accountability is endogenous to their origins. He highlights the “*Freedom Squares*”, the “*Kgotla*”, and the role of “*Traditional Authorities*” in institutionalizing accountability in the country. Politicians first established Freedom Squares during the first national elections in 1965. They needed a local venue to engage in dialogue with a population that was almost totally illiterate and had few radios. Community members of all political beliefs were allowed to question the rally's speakers. In most rural areas, freedom squares are the primary means the citizenry uses to obtain information about party politics. The *Kgotla* meetings are the traditional gatherings chiefs have used for centuries to correspond with local communities. This remains an important part of the democratic accountability process in rural areas as government ministers visit *Kgotla* meetings to seek community approval for local development projects.

According to Holm, these visits were not only integral to standard bureaucratic needs assessment activities, but also were opportunities for senior officials to convince politicians and foreign donors that the government was accountable to the people when policies were implemented at the grassroots level. In other words, the need to obtain *Kgotla* approval has become a mandatory part of the initiation of projects in the rural areas. More important, civil servants develop program, knowing they must be prepared to defend their proposals at the community level and not just order their implementation. *Traditional Authorities* have also played a role in ensuring

that issues affecting their local communities are on the local agenda. For example, chiefs and headmen have defended their districts or communities against actions proposed by government ministries. Community involvement has ensured that the people participate in the governance of their local areas and, in some cases, local resources have been utilized to accomplish their goals.

A participatory approach to governance—where locals are involved in designing and implementing programs means that the people participate in establishing priorities. In some African countries, the government has ignored the “voice” of the rural areas. However, the desire to improve governance has introduced new “actors” seeking to defend and further their interests in the policy process. Politicians who have practiced the policy of exclusion by monopolizing the benefits of state resources find it more difficult now to appropriate the benefits of governance for their own private interests. Decentralizing powers can be tricky, particularly if there is no real delegation of authority including authority to generate and reserve a portion of local revenues. The African Development Foundation (ADF) and the World Bank are currently supporting participatory development projects that give group members not only control over the design and implementation of their project but also the resources needed to implement it. This simply means that all the individuals in the group are able to participate in the decision-making process, including identification of the problem, project design, implementation, distribution of benefits, and evaluation of impact. Below are two examples of projects supported separately by the World Bank<sup>4</sup> and the ADF<sup>5</sup>, that seeks to promote accountability through an inclusive and participatory process in governance.

In Tanzania, for example, with support from the ADF the Songambele Fishing Society—a forgotten population of 12,000 people in the island of Tumbatu, near the larger island of Zanzibar, off the coast of Tanzania, will implement their own strategy and establish their priorities. Twenty-nine individuals organized the Songambele Fishing Society in 1988. With contributions from members engaged in lime-making and petty trading, they managed to acquire one fishing boat. Eventually, they were able to buy another boat from their earnings although they still had to rent expensive nets from other more prosperous fishermen. Despite these efforts, many of Songambele’s members could not fully engage in fishing nor earn enough money to meet basic survival needs. The society’s attempt to obtain a bank loan failed.

With support from the ADF, which included funds for building three new boats and a workshed, purchasing four outboard engines and fishing gear, and technical and management training. In six months, the Songambele compiled an impressive record of accomplishments. They constructed three new boats, and started open sea fishing operations; increased members’ income from \$10 per month to \$45 per month; increased daily, marketable fish supply by 200 percent per boat; fully employed all twenty-nine members; employed eight community members part-time as net makers, boat repairers and watchmen; completed 85 percent of the work shed construction; and realized a gross profit of \$1,000 every two weeks from the four boats.

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<sup>4</sup> The Africa Region of the World Bank has funded quite a few Community-based projects. A recent analysis shows that 75 percent of African projects with some level of community participation have been rated satisfactory by the Operations Evaluation Department (OED) of the World Bank, against 60 percent for all African projects in 1994-1997.

<sup>5</sup> For more details on the Songambele project and others supported by the African Development Foundation, refer to “Participatory Development: Report on ADF Funded Projects, Fiscal years 1994-1996; or visit their website at <http://www.adf.gov/bpl.html>

Building on previous World Bank Institute (WBI) work in selected countries, a “pilot” core course on curbing corruption was launched in June 1999. A diverse group of stakeholders from seven countries Benin, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Tanzania, and Uganda, came together to present a program of action at the 9th International Anti-Corruption Conference in Durban, South Africa. The course is based upon a participatory approach that produces an integrated action oriented framework. The process empowers the participant country teams as they lead in the preparation of their own, rigorous, action programs, explicitly stating and requesting from WBI and the Africa Region staff at each stage their highest priorities for technical advice or assistance. Participants, selected from their countries to represent key governmental, private sector, and civil society organizations dedicated to anti-corruption, work together through the process of action program design, then discuss and review the challenges of integrating the participatory process with concrete institutional reforms. The ultimate objective of this process is to conduct anti-corruption institutional reforms formulated and ‘owned’ by the participant country teams.

The Program has demonstrated that an inclusive and participatory approach in developing strategies to fight corruption, together with empirical knowledge and rigorous analysis is critical to success. As a result of this initiative, participants in the various teams have become catalysts in their home countries. They are working to build coalitions among various stakeholders (e.g. the Ghana Anti-Corruption Coalition was formed after the Durban workshop; TACIMO has been formed in Tanzania to monitor the implementation of the National Anti-Corruption Action Plan), and are now taking concrete steps to address the problem of corruption. The major output of the course was a series of national anti-corruption strategies<sup>6</sup>, developed by the teams; the outcome was a wholly client-owned national action plan supported by a broad coalition of stakeholders including, in many instances, the Head of State, Parliamentarians, key members of the Executive as well as leaders from civil society, journalists and business.

These two examples demonstrate that a participative and inclusive approach helps to generate local ownership, put people in the driver’s seat, harness their capabilities and, consequently, improves development. The fight against corruption should be seen from this perspective. The strategies for countries should be home grown and not donor-driven. Even when they are locally developed, they should not be central government-driven as it creates a dependency syndrome. Local communities are forced to rely on the center for “hand-outs.” When the people own reform programs, it goes a long way in preventing social exclusion and the capture of the programs by both the politicians in the center and the elites in the urban areas. However, the international community still has a role to play in the fight against corruption. In the next section, several suggestions will be made on the role of the international community.

## **THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY**

The previous section briefly discussed some of the international efforts that confront corruption, money laundering, and organized crime. The intent of this section is to build on the argument that sustainable reform in Africa must be integral to the domestic agenda and not driven by

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<sup>6</sup> For more details on the seven country programs, please visit the World Bank Institute's website [www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance](http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance).

international donors. Kenya and Sierra Leone, where the constituency for reform is weak, illustrate the obvious danger of dealing with the perennial problem of whether the reform efforts are genuine or simply attempts to appease donors.

Corruption is an intricately woven set of circumstances that occur as a result of the actions of domestic as well as international actors within the political, economic and social sectors of a country. Consequently, collaboration and coordination among the members of the international development community are increasingly crucial to an effective campaign to reduce corruption. A solid commitment from the government, the private sector and civil society along with institutional changes are required to develop and enact concrete solutions--solutions that include both preventive as well as punitive measures that address accountability, transparency and system inequities, politically and economically.

International donors have taken several steps to address corruption both within their various organizations and in their policies for granting loans and grants to developing countries. Multilateral institutions such as the World Bank, IMF, and UNDP, and several bilateral donors have all instituted new policies to either prevent corruption in their projects and/or support international efforts such as the OECD convention that seeks the criminalization of bribery in international business transactions. However, international efforts, especially from multi and bilateral donors have to support and compliment domestic strategies. If a particular country does not have ongoing public sector reforms as part of their broader governance policy process, international remedies will be ineffective. Sanctions can be imposed as we saw in 1997 when the World Bank and IMF withheld multi-million dollars assistance to Kenya, and suspended a number of investment projects until they prove there is a credible commitment to change (Washington Post, 1997). Similar action was taken against Tanzania in 1994, when the donor community suspended aid and conditioned future assistance on the government's commitment to recover evaded and exempted taxes and to initiate legal action against corrupt officials (The Executive, August, 1995 Dar Es Salaam).

Donors can continue to support the domestic agenda in countries genuinely struggling with reform. First, they may want to consider putting additional pressure on countries with invasive persistent fraud and mismanagement. Countries requesting help may be required to demonstrate their commitment in their country budgets by increasing the support allocated to anti-corruption efforts. Perhaps the idea of matching funds from donors should be considered--donors promise to match whatever the country has in their budget for anti-corruption measures.

Second, bilateral donors should ensure that political corruption is a priority in their policy agenda, especially since the mandate of multilaterals such as the World Bank limits this activity. Political corruption is a fundamental problem that needs to be addressed--campaign financing; checks and balances; civil liberties, structured competition in both political and economic realms, etc., are all factors that are important in the fight against corruption. For example, political competition can place a check upon arbitrary political interference in the bureaucracy, encouraging genuine oversight in its place and can maintain healthy opposition to political attempts to compromise judiciary and regulatory agencies.

Third, donors may want to encourage collective action to deal with corruption and more important, target additional support to programs that promote such action among various

stakeholders in developing and implementing anti-corruption reforms. Having an inclusive and participatory approach (involving all stakeholders--government, civil society, private sector, media, etc.) to designing and implementing anti-corruption reforms helps to sustain the process. However, given the mutual suspicion that exists between governments, anti-corruption agencies and civil society, it is unclear whether government reformers genuinely attempt to involve civil society and the private sector in anti-corruption activities. Coalition building between civil society and the government continues to be one of the foci in future reform strategies, and support for this process is crucial to its sustainability as well as strengthening political will.

A fourth suggestion is for donors to encourage countries to adopt long-term strategies. Granted that the issue of getting "quick wins" is important in the early stages of any anti-corruption program to ensure vision, but the issue of a long-term vision and strategy is equally important. The mission is to tie political security and/or insecurity of political leaders to the way power changes hands. For example, when leaders believe they are secure in office, they are more likely to view corruption as a long-term fight. Leaders whose positions are tentative may be more inclined to concentrate on immediate or short-term solutions as a way of staying in power. Adopting short-term approaches opens society to more abuse, which ultimately erodes the strength and legitimacy of the reigning regime. Donors should encourage and help borrower countries to design long-term strategies that can be prioritized into short, medium and long-term goals.

Given the current global trend and advances in technology, it may be useful if donors consider encouraging governments to allow more transparency by posting important financial information available on the Internet. For example, governments can publicize their budgets and accounts and other relevant information on development and even the laws relating to finance, regulations, and anti-corruption. This effort can start this process by designing joint web pages, which list recipients of loans and grants and the types of programs they are supporting. One example of an ongoing effort is Transparency International in collaboration with OECD and the Asian Development Bank are proposing the construction of the *Asian Anti-Corruption website*, with the objective of tracking the anti-corruption programs of all donors in the region as well as collect and disseminate Asia-specific data on corruption.

Another suggestion is for donors to consider providing more support to NGOs or CBOs that provide practical initiatives, especially at the municipal level. This support would be in addition to any they provide to NGOs presently working through policy instruments. For example, the USAID-funded Americas' Accountability and Anti-Corruption (AAA) Project coordinates the Donor Consultative Group (DCG) on Accountability and Anti-Corruption in Latin America and the Caribbean. The DCG is composed of six bilateral and twelve international donors and uses the bilingual (Spanish/English) newsletter *Accountability* as its communication vehicle. In 1999, AAA implemented Anti-Corruption Without Borders/Anti-Corruption Sin Fronteras for LAC/NGOs with anti-corruption components. ACWB/ACSF promotes the use of Internet resources and a Regional Network of Anti-Corruption NGOs to strengthen the capacity of NGOs and to enhance their contributions to anti-corruption efforts. As the Tanzanian example demonstrated earlier, community-based programs have a higher rate of success and provide the "neglected" people in the rural areas the opportunity to participate in their governance.

Additionally, supporting such projects provides an opportunity for citizens to articulate their needs, establish their priorities, and monitor service delivery effectively.

Reform initiatives have to be seen as coming from within and donors have to be cognizant of this reality in their program design. They can do appraisals to satisfy their project demands, but rather than provide government options of what to do, they should demand or help the government come up with strategies, and then fund programs within those strategies. The issue of fragmentation will be a non-issue if donors support programs within an overall strategy that they have worked with the government to develop. Supporting programs outside the strategy creates a problem of incoherence and lack of coordination on the part of donors. Uganda is currently moving toward this type of arrangement. The Government has approved an anti-corruption plan for the next few years, with an aim to improve coordination and implementation. The Ministry of Ethics and Integrity convenes an inter-agency forum on corruption and coordinates all activities. Several public institutions are involved including the judiciary, the Director of Public Prosecutions, the Inspectorate of Government, Parliament, and the police. They meet regularly with donors that have been useful in encouraging joint planning as well as improving the coordination among donor programs.

Finally, and most important, donors should provide support to nurture political will in countries where it is either weak or totally lacking. The presence of political will is a critical starting point for sustainable and effective anti-corruption strategies and programs. However, its presence cannot always be assumed in reform efforts. Reformers face resistance from groups that benefit from corruption in any society, and coupled with their insecurity in office about how power changes hands, their political will to pursue reform is threatened. The risk involved in this pursuit is real and there are numerous examples of well-intended regimes that have engineered their own downfall through inept and or ineffective strategies. Michael Johnston (1998) reminds us that the will to fight corruption has as much in common with the will to pursue any other goal. It must be given space to grow from within a political system and eventually to ensure its effectiveness and sustainability, become an integral part of basic social and economic processes.

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